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Abstract
This paper presents a set of benchmark moments for evaluation
or estimation of quantitative capital structure models. The moments
are directly related to the models being studied: the main features of
each models’ empirical policy functions. The paper describe a general
method for estimating these benchmarks and shows that they capture
a substantial part of the actual variation in firms actions in the data.
Two versions of these benchmarks are presented: one dimensional ones
and two dimensional ones. In both cases we express these as the total
change in the control variable and the change relative to the change
in the state variable. The empirical policy functions turn out to be
smooth and mostly monotonous. Three key numbers that we suggest
quantitative dynamic models have match closely are that within firms,
for every 10% increase in debt relative to assets investment relative to
assets declines 3.7%, debt issuance relative to market value decreases
1.1% and equity issuance relative to market value increases 0.5%.
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1 Introduction
While there is a large literature addressing the issue of capital structure
dynamics, there is no agreement yet on what is a good standard model.
One of the problems in finding such a model is that there is no agreed-upon
evaluation method for the large list of models out there. Each one is esti-
mated or calibrated to fit a particular set of moments or particular features
of the data, but there is no single objective that they are all aiming for.1
Most of the existing capital structure theory is described in static settings
which are very difficult to contrast directly with the data, and therefore the
issue of the right benchmarks to match has not been considered important
before. However, one of the main advantages of writing fully dynamic cap-
ital structure models is that we can easily compare them to the data and
therefore that we can impose more discipline on them by asking them to
match certain features of it quantitatively.
This paper argues that for each model in the literature there is a set
of natural moments that can serve as benchmarks for evaluating it quanti-
tatively. Moreover, these benchmarks are to a large extent common across
existing models. A large fraction of these models are state space models
where the firm sets the value of financial and real control variables as a func-
tion of its current state. Often solving the model implies finding the policy
functions of the firm or a numerical approximation of these policy functions.
While these models are slightly different they can typically be written in a
form where the exogenous state of nature is productivity and the endoge-
nous state of nature is the level of debt. We argue that the moments that are
natural benchmarks candidates are the empirical counterparts of the firms’
optimal policy functions. In these models the policy function is often the
amount of debt issuance that the firm undertakes. Slightly different models
allow for more complicated state and policy variables, for example adding
capital, cash and dividends, but there is little variation overall. Therefore a
small set of benchmarks can be established that allows us to compare models
1For example Hennessy and Whited (2005), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), Gamba and
Triantis (2008), Palazzo(2011), Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007)
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to each other meaningfully.
The empirical counterparts of policy functions are a natural benchmark
because the intuition of the model is embedded in them. There is very lit-
tle intuition in finding that a model finds average leverage to be, say, 40%.
There is also little intuition in finding the cross section or time series corre-
lation among variables, the variance or the estimated speed of adjustment.
Instead, these ‘empirical policy functions’ codify the main issues that Corpo-
rate Finance typically has cared about. For example the questions: In which
state of nature do firms issue debt? How much higher is the investment rate
of low debt firms? are two ‘policy function’ questions. Furthermore the es-
sential test for dynamic models should be whether they get the ’dynamics’ in
the data correctly, abstrating away from any firm heterogeneity. Therefore
we argue that the right estimates
Also, the nature of the standard models in this area is such that the
timing assumptions have a important impact on the resulting variances and
correlations across variables. Slight changes in the timing, the variance or
the auto-correlation of the shocks in the models leads to dramatic changes
in the estimated variances, correlations and regression estimates in model
simulations. This also suggests that the key quantitative benchmarks should
not be these variances, correlations and regression estimates, but should
instead be the direct predictions of the model: how do firms react to different
states of the world.
We show that the benchmarks we present are relevant in the sense that
they capture a non-negligible fraction of the total variation in firms behavior.
Therefore models that meet these benchmarks rationalize important features
of the data.
This paper proceeds as follows: The first section describes the empiri-
cal method in the paper; the second section describes a generic model and
presents the estimated empirical policy functions; the third section exem-
plifies the evaluation method by describing a particular model and showing
where the model is successful and where it fails; section four concludes.
3
2 Generic Model and Example
The most popular dynamic capital structure models can be described in
terms of the Bellman equation:
V (x) = maxy(D(x, y) + Ex′|x,y[βV (x′)]]
where x′ ∼ g(x, y).
Here V (x) represents the market value of the firm’s equity when the state
variable takes value x, D(x, y) represents dividends paid to shareholders or
equity issuance, β is the discount factor and E[·] is the expectation over
the value of x′ given x and y. Also, g(x, y) represents the law of motion of
the state variable. Typically the variable x contains the firms productivity
pi and its leverage  L. The control variable y typically consists of leverage
changes ∆L.
The firm is assumed to observe x and then to maximizes the present
discounted value of the sum of current and future dividends by setting y,
the control variable, optimally during each period. The law of motion of
the state is such that the future state x′ is a (random) function of the state
variable in the past x, and the value of control variable y.
In this generic setup, the solution of the model consists of the optimal
policy functions and the value function of the firm. These policy function
h(x) and value function V(x) are the functions that satisfy the following
system:
h(x) = argmaxy[D(x, y) + E[βV (x)]
and
V (x) = D(x, h(x)) + E[βV (x)]
The rest of this section describes an example of a model in this literature:
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2.1 The firm’s cash flow
The firm’s cash flow (CR) is the difference between its income from sales of
output (AtK
α
t ), where K is capital and A is a productivity shock, plus its
net debt issuance (∆B), minus its net expenditure on investment (C(It))
and its interest payments on debt (Btr
B
t ):
CFt = AtK
α
t − C(It) + ∆Bt −BtrBt (1)
(2)
2.2 Dividends and equity issuance
The firm’s dividends and equity issuance are defined in terms of the firm’s
cash flows. A positive cash flow implies the firm’s optimal decision is to pay
dividends (Div = CF ) to its stockholders, a negative cash flow implies that
the firm’s optimal decision is to set dividends at 0 and instead obtain funds
from the equity market (X = −CF ). Here λ stands for the (proportional)
cost of issuing equity.
CFt > 0 ⇒ Divt = CFt, Xt = 0 (3)
CFt ≤ 0 ⇒ Divt = 0, Xt = (1 + λ)(−CFt) (4)
2.3 The firm’s optimization problem
The firms problem is to maximize the discounted value of dividends for
current owners of the firm. With this objective the firm chooses investment
and net debt issuance. These variables feed into their respective laws of
motion, for capital (K) and debt (B), where δ is the rate of depreciation
. Also, the firm’s choices are restricted by the firm’s cash flow equation
described further below. Finally, the firm receives log-normally distributed
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productivity shocks (A).
Vt = max
It,∆Bt
[(
Dt + Et[βV
′
t+1]
) ( Vt
Vt +Xt
)]
(5)
Kt+1 = Kt(1− δ) + It (6)
Bt+1 = Bt + ∆Bt (7)
At = A¯+ ρAt−1 + σtt ∼ Z(0, 1) (8)
2.4 Interest rate on debt
The interest rate on debt is a function of leverage:
rBt = R
rf +Rrp((Bt − φKt)/E[AtKt])2 (9)
2.5 Real sector frictions
The firm faces a set of frictions. Consistent with most of the literature
it faces convex costs of investment as well as some degree of investment
irreversibility. The firm’s cost of investment function includes the cost of
purchasing the capital, plus a convex cost of investment and plus an invest-
ment irreversibility term.
C(It) = It + γ
ccKt(It/Kt)
2 − γIrIt ∗ (It < 0), (10)
where γCC represents the magnitude of convex costs of investment and γIr
represents the magnitude of investment irreversibility.
3 Empirical Policy Functions
In order to obtain empirical policy function estimates it is necessary to have
estimates of (a) the state in which firms are and of (b) the policies that
they follow in each state. We use a simple process inspired in the portfolio
formation frequently used in the asset pricing literature.
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An empirical equivalent of the function h(x) can be found by estimating
a function
ˆh(x) = ( ˆh1(x), ˆh2(x), ..., ˆhN (x)).
where ˆhi(x) represents the average behavior along control dimension i for
firms that observe a value x for the state variable. However, with continu-
ous state variables in x, there are generally no two firms with the same x.
Therefore we estimate ˆh(x) by splitting the state space into percentile bins
for each of the state variables and then estimating the average choice for the
control variables for all firms within a particular bin.
Step 1: Obtain de-meaned (at firm level) values for each state and control
variable. The models described and exemplified above are typically models
where firms are ex-ante homogenous. Also, we are concerned mainly with the
dynamics of the different variables. For these reasons we estimate the state
of nature of firms by de-meaning all variables at the level of the individual
firm. An reasonable alternative specification would consist of de-meaning
the variables at the industry level.
Step 2: Generate bins across each of the state variables of the model.
We define these bins as the 0%-20%, 20%-40%, 40%-60%, 60%-80% and
80%-100% percentiles of each (de-meaned) state variable. the Classify each
observation of each state variable as belonging into one variable-specific
bin. This is done independently for each variable, i.e. it is ’non-sequential’
sorting. Each firm-period observation is therefore given a classification as
b(xi,t) = (b1, b2, ...bN ), with each bi rep[resenting state variable i’s classifica-
tion for that firm in that period.
Step 3: Estimate the average value of the control variable as the average
observed choice within each of the (composite) bins:
hi(B) = mean{xj,t|b(j,t)=B}Hi(j,t)
where Hi(xj,t) represents the observed choice of the control variable i by
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firm j at time t.
Step 4: Summarize ˆh(x) by describing its linear and quadratic properties.
I.e., describe the different between the policies of the first and the last bin
across each state variable, keeping the other state variables constant, and
describe whether the relation is monotonous, and/or concave or convex.
Step 5: Replicate Steps 1-4 for simulated data from the model and compare
the model and the data, focusing on the benchmarks described in the tables
below.
4 Benchmarks
4.1 Data
We use the well known accounting data from Compustat from 1970 to 2010.
We drop all firms without at least 10 observations in the annual files. We
drop any observations where any of the variables are missing. We define the
following variables to be used in the rest of the analysis:
• Market Value (MV ): Book Value of Liabilities + Market Value of
Equity
• (Book) Leverage (L): Total Liabilities /Total Assets
• Investment Rate (I): %∆ (Property Plant and Equipment)/Total As-
sets
• Debt Issuance (D): (Debt Issuance - Debt Repurchasing) / MV
• Equity Issuance (X): Common and Preferred Shares Net Sales / MV
• Profitability (pi): Operating Income Before Depreciation /Total Assets
4.2 State Variable Variation
The variation of the state variables is an essential quantitative feature of the
data. Table 1 describes the distribution of the (de-meaned) state variables
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Table 1: Empirical Estimate of State Variables’ Range
Quantile
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 5-1
Profitability -0.118 -0.022 0.003 0.029 0.120 0.238
Leverage -0.178 -0.052 -0.007 0.036 0.173 0.351
Market to Book -1.222 -0.262 -0.039 0.182 1.646 2.868
in the data. It shows that the bottom quintile of profitability is about 12%
lower than the mean, while the top quintile is about 12% higher, so that the
5-1 inter-quantile range is about 24% of average profitability. With respect
to leverage it shows that the inter-quantile range is about 35% of total assets,
evenly distributed above and below the mean. with respect to market to
book it shows that the inter-quantile range is (an astonishing) 287% of the
book value of the firm, somewhat skewed towards to top of the distribution.
4.3 Benchmarks for Models - One State Variable
Tables 2 through 4 describe the empirical estimates of the firm’s optimal
policies as a function of the values of different state variables: Leverage,
Profitability and the Book to Market ratio. They are the benchmarks that
correspond directly to models with a single state variable. They can also be
used for models with more state variables by integrating out (though simu-
lation) the other state variables. These tables also describe the differences
between the observed policy in the first and last quintile and the correspond-
ing difference between the first and last quintile of the control variable when
classified in bins on its own. The last column contains the ratio of these two
numbers. We have called it the ’potential R2 in the sense that it tells us
how much of the total variation in the control variable can be potentially
traced to differences in the state variable of the model.
The three tables show large variation in firms’ investment as a function
of the state variable. The investment rate is 13% lower for firms with high
debt than for firms with low debt. It is 16% higher for firms with high
profitability relative to firms with low profitability and it is a full 25% larger
for firms with high Market to Book than form firms with low Market to
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Book .
In contrast to the findings for investment, we find relatively small varia-
tion in debt and equity issuance as a function of any of the state variables,
however, this variation is still a relatively high fraction of the total variation
in debt and equity issuance in the sample. As we’d expect leverage leads
firms to issue less debt about 4% less as a fraction of market value, and to
issue more equity, about 2% more as a fraction of market value. Higher prof-
itability leads to more debt issuance and to less equity issuance. A higher
Market to Book ratio leads to more debt and more equity issuance.
Table 2: Empirical Policy Functions, x= {Leverage}
Leverage Sorts (t-1) Policy’s Variable’s Potential
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 q5-q1 q5-q1 R2
Investment 0.055 0.002 -0.025 -0.041 -0.075 -0.130 0.900 0.144
Debt I. 0.020 0.007 0.000 -0.007 -0.020 -0.039 0.157 0.248
Equity I. -0.010 -0.006 -0.003 0.001 0.009 0.019 0.105 0.182
Table 3: Empirical Policy Functions, x= {Profitability}
Profitability Sorts (t-1) Policy’s Variable’s Potential
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 q5-q1 q5-q1 R2
Investment -0.102 -0.051 -0.017 0.021 0.065 0.166 0.900 0.185
Debt I. -0.007 -0.006 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.013 0.157 0.084
Equity I. 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.010 0.105 0.094
Table 4: Empirical Policy Functions, x= {Market to Book}
M/B Sorts (t-1) Policy’s Variable’s Potential
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 q5-q1 q5-q1 R2
Investment -0.142 -0.066 -0.022 0.029 0.117 0.259 0.900 0.288
Debt I. -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 0.007 0.009 0.015 0.157 0.097
Equity I. -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.010 0.105 0.097
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4.3.1 Relative Variation: State and Control Variables
Table 5: Variation of Control Variables Relative to State Variables
Leverage
Variable q5-q1
Control Var.(q5-q1) /
State Var.(q5-q1)
Investment -0.130 -0.37
Debt I. -0.039 -0.11
Equity I. 0.019 0.054
Profitability
Variable q5-q1
Control Var.(q5-q1) /
State Var.(q5-q1)
Investment 0.166 0.72
Debt I. 0.013 0.057
Equity I. -0.010 -0.0434
Market to Book
Variable q5-q1
Control Var.(q5-q1) /
State Var.(q5-q1)
Investment 0.259 0.090
Debt I. 0.015 0.0052
Equity I. 0.010 0.0034
An essential measure of whether our theories explain the data is one that
compares the relative variation of explanatory and dependent variables. The
figures in table 5 show this comparison. These are one set of benchmarks
for dynamic model evaluation: they describe the relative variation in the
data between state variables and control variables. Under this measure a
quantitatively good dynamic model of investment and debt issuance that as
a function of changing profitability and current leverage is one that repli-
cates the relative variation in investment and debt issuance with respect to
leverage and profitability.
Table 5 describes these relative variations by combining the information
in the empirical policy function estimates in tables 2 trough 4 and that in
table 1. With respect to leverage it shows that a 10% change in debt relative
to total assets leads in the data to a 3.7% decrease in investment relative to
total assets, to a -1.1% decrease in debt issuance relative to market value
and to a 0.5% increase in equity issuance relative to the firm’s market value.
With respect to profitability it shows that a 10% change in profits relative
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to total assets leads in the data to a 7.2% increase in investment relative to
total assets, to a 0.6% increase in debt issuance relative to market value and
to a 0.4% decrease in equity issuance relative to the firm’s market value.
Finally, with respect to market to book it shows that a 10% change in the
market value relative to total assets leads in the data to a 0.9% increase
in investment relative to total assets, to a 0.05% increase in debt issuance
relative to market value and to a 0.034% increase in equity issuance relative
to the firm’s market value.
4.4 Benchmarks for Models - Two State Variables
Tables 6 through 8 describe the estimated empirical policy functions for
models that have two state variables, either Leverage and Profitability, or
Leverage and Market to Book or Market to Book and Profitability. As
in the one state variable benchmarks they can also be used for evaluating
moments with more state variables by integrating out the extra dimensions.
For purposes of readability we present and focus only the differences in
behavior for firms at the ’edges’ of the sample.
Table 6 shows that as before leverage and profitability are strong deter-
minants of investment. However this table also shows that Profitability has
a stronger impact on investment when leverage is high: the investment of
highly profitable firms is 16% larger as a fraction of total assets than the
investment of low profitability firms, when leverage is high but it is only
11% higher when leverage is low.
It also shows that the impact of profitability on debt issuance changes
sign depending on whether the firm is highly levered or not: the debt is-
suance of more profitable firms is higher than that of less profitable firms
when leverage is low, but it is lower than that of unprofitable firms when
leverage is high.
The behavior of equity issuance as a function of profitability is the mirror
image of that for debt issuance. However, the difference in equity issuance
between the highly levered and the un-levered firms is most notorious for
firms that are highly profitable. These firms seem to ’readjust’ their capital
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Table 6: Empirical Policy Functions, x= {Profitability, Leverage}
Variable: Investment
Profitability
Leverage
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.11
2 -0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06
3 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.04
4 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.03
5 -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.16
5-1 -0.11 -0.10
Variable: Debt Issuance
Profitability
Leverage
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
4 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
5 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
5-1 -0.03 -0.03
Variable: Equity Issuance
Profitability
Leverage
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
2 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01
5-1 0.01 0.02
structure faster than do unprofitable firms.
Table 8 describes the behavior of firms across investment, debt issuance
and equity issuance, as a function of the Market to Book ratio and Prof-
itability. It shows that, firms with high market to book invest substantially
more as a fraction of total assets than firms with low Market to Book ratios.
However, it also shows that this effect is more pronounced for firms with
high leverage.
The table also shows that the difference between the debt issuance of
high and low market to book firms is concentrated on the high leverage
firms. High market to book firms issue more debt than low market to book
firms only within the sample of firms for which leverage is already relatively
high.
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Table 7: Empirical Policy Functions, x= {Market to Book, Leverage}
Variable: Investment
Market/Book
Leverage
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 -0.10 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.18 0.18
2 -0.13 -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.11
3 -0.14 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.09
4 -0.15 -0.08 -0.05 0.01 0.07
5 -0.18 -0.12 -0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.27
5-1 -0.08 -0.10
Variable: Debt Issuance
Market/Book
Leverage
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
3 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
4 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
5 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02
5-1 -0.03 -0.02
Variable: Equity Issuance
Market/Book
Leverage
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
3 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
5 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
5-1 0.02 0.03
With respect to equity issuance the table shows that high market to book
firms issue more equity than low market to book firms, but this is also only
true within the sub-sample that has relatively high leverage. It also shows
that the extra equity issuance of highly levered firms is higher for firms with
high market to book.
Table 8 describes firms’ average control variable choices as a function
of the market to book ratio and of profitability. It shows that the higher
investment of market to book firms is more pronounced for firms with high
profitability. It also shows that the higher investment of more profitable
firms is more pronounced for firms with higher market to book ratios.
With respect to debt issuance, it shows that the higher debt issuance
of firms with higher market to book values is more pronounced for firms
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Table 8: Empirical Policy Functions, x= {Market to Book, Profitability}
Variable: Investment
Market/Book
Profitability
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 -0.18 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.14
2 -0.13 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.08
3 -0.13 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.07
4 -0.10 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.11
5 -0.10 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.26
5-1 0.08 0.11
Variable: Debt Issuance
Market/Book
Profitability
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01
3 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
5 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
5-1 0.01 0.00
Variable: Equity Issuance
Market/Book
Profitability
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
2 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
5-1 -0.02 -0.02
with low profitability. Along the profitability dimension it shows that the
higher debt issuance of more profitable firms is concentrated on those with
low market to book values.
With respect to equity issuance, it shows that it is homogenously 2%
lower as a fraction of market to book for high profitability firms than for
low profitability firms, irrespective of the value of the market to book ratio.
Also, the table shows that equity issuance is homogenously higher for firms
with higher market to book, also about 2% as a fraction of market value,
irrespective of the level of profitability.
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5 Conclusions
This paper describes a set of benchmarks that can be used for the quantita-
tive evaluation of dynamic corporate finance models and the methodology
with which to construct them for any given model, based on its state and
control variables. The benchmarks are the empirical counterparts of the op-
timal policy functions of the firm, defined over the state space for each of the
control variables. We presented these benchmarks for models where invest-
ment and/or debt issuance and/or equity issuance are the control variables
and where profitability, leverage and/or market to book are the state vari-
ables. Three key numbers that we suggest quantitative dynamic models have
match closely are that within firms, for every 10% increase in debt relative
to assets investment relative to assets declines 3.7%, debt issuance relative
to market value decreases 1.1% and equity issuance relative to market value
increases 0.5%. Also,
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